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1. Introduction 
The collapse of the socialist system opened up alternative pathways of the postsocialist 
transformation. In some countries political dictatorship gave way to political democracy and 
the centrally planned socialist economy was transformed into a capitalist system, thus 
democratic capitalism was established. In other cases new political dictatorships came into 
existence linked to a state-dominated postsocialist economic system. In between these two 
extremes other two political economies emerged, namely a capitalist system with defective 
democracy and a capitalist dictatorship. Figure 1 shows all these postsocialist variants. 
 
Figure 1. Varieties of postsocialist systems 
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 All variants could be understood as self-reproducing systems, still, the emergence of 
democratic capitalism was perceived as a major success and assumed to be the most stable 
from among all postsocialist variants.1 However, in a few countries2 the last couple of years 
saw an unexpected regression of democratic capitalism to a defective democracy and 
distorted market economy. These changes raise the question of how to explain what has been 
taking place right now? Why may postsocialist democratic capitalism prove to be less stable 
than western democratic capitalism or the other variants of postsocialist systems? How could 
the regression come into existence in the first place? This paper does not intend to answer 
these questions directly and does not examine empirical cases of the regression. My aim is 
more modest: I will discuss a few theories of the postsocialist transformation in order to find 
out how theory should deal with the regression of postsocialist democratic capitalism. What 
can we learn from the previous theoretical debates and controversies? What are those 
concepts and theories that we need for a causal explanation of the regression of postsocialist 
democratic capitalism? 
 First, I will look at those theories that discuss the relationship of capitalism and 
democracy in general. Second, I will deal with the theoretical controversy about the 
relationship between postsocialist marketization and democratization. Third, I will look at 
arguments that focus on the structural factors of postsocialist democracy and the tensions that 
may exist within postsocialist democratic capitalism. Fourth, I will argue that in order to 
develop a causal explanation of the regression of postsocialist democratic capitalism one has 
to focus on the patterns of party competition in the postsocialist countries. Finally, I will 
conclude. 
 
2. Mainstream theories on capitalism and democracy 
The arguments about the relationship between capitalism and democracy can be grouped into 
four different theorems (see Table 1).  
 
                                                     
1 The theories assuming the stability of democratic capitalism will be discussed in the next two sections of this 
paper. 
2 Let me mention Hungary, Poland, Romania. 
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Table 1. Theories about the relationship of capitalism and democracy3 
Causal link supportive (+) antagonistic (-) 
Capitalism→Democracy 
Necessity theorem 
Capitalism is the necessary 
condition of democracy 
there is no political freedom 
without economic freedom 
Inequality theorem 
Capitalism limits democracy 
market inequalities 
override  political equality 
Democracy→Capitalism 
Optimality theorem 
Democracy is the optimal 
condition for capitalism 
democracy is the 
institutional guarantee for a 
free market and private 
property rights 
Disability theorem 
Democracy limits capitalism 
market actors use 
democracy for 
constraining the freedom 
of market and private 
property rights 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
The necessity theorem4 and the optimality theorem point out that there is a structurally based 
correspondence between capitalism and democracy. Capitalism supports democracy and 
democracy supports capitalism because both assume the separation of the economy and the 
polity: the emergence of civil rights and freedoms and political rights and freedom reflect and 
also reinforce this separation (Acemoglu – Robinson 2012; North et al. 2009; Olson 1993; 
Lindblom 1977). For this reason democratic capitalism should be a stable mix. The inequality 
theorem argues that economic inequalities that are the intrinsic features of capitalism, 
constrain and bias the working of political democracy. Those who have more economic 
power, the winners, will also have more political power. The economic inequalities of 
capitalism are translated into political inequalities (Downs (957; Przeworski – Wallerstein 
1988). The disability theorem (Beetham 1993) points out that democracy may undermine 
capitalism because the losers of the economy relying on their political rights as voters can 
undermine or limit those basic economic institutions of capitalism (private property and 
market coordination) that are the sources of economic inequality (Dahl 1993). Both theorems 
argue that there is a tension between capitalism and democracy. For this reason democratic 
capitalism should be an unstable mix. 
 Theories emphasizing the structural compatibility of capitalism and democracy need 
to conclude that democratic capitalism is a stable and sustainable system. Theories pointing 
out that there is a tension between capitalism and democracy may contribute to the 
                                                     
3 The analytical construction of this table comes from Offe (1987). Offe set up two tables, one examined the 
theories about the relationship between market and welfare state, the other examined the theories about the 
relationship between democracy and welfare state. He did not deal with the theories about the relationship 
between democracy and market (capitalism). 
4 The term comes from Beetham (1993). 
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understanding of the regression of democratic capitalism since these tensions may weaken 
democratic capitalism and may lead to regression. 
 So are these theories right or wrong? Looking at these arguments from an analytical 
perspective we may say that there is no logical contradiction among them, since the theorems 
about the positive linkage between capitalism and democracy focus on the issue of liberty, 
while those about the negative linkage between capitalism and democracy look at the issues 
of equality versus inequality. Economic and political liberties do maintain economic and 
political inequalities, capitalism and democracy simultaneously reinforce and limit each 
other. In other words, the stability of democratic capitalism is not based on the exclusion of 
destabilizing tensions between capitalism and democracy but on the internalization of them. 
An important corollary of this argument is the understanding that the emergence and stability 
of democratic capitalism is based on the role of winners of capitalism.5 To sum up, the 
controversy about the relationship between capitalism and democracy supports the thesis 
about the sustainability of democratic capitalism. This thesis fits the development of 
democratic capitalism well in the West. 
 
3. Theories on the relationship of postsocialist democratization and marketization 
The postsocialist transformation revived the discourse on the relationship between capitalism 
and democracy, since the collapse of socialism opened up a pathway to democracy and 
capitalism. At first sight the theoretical controversy about democratization and marketization 
in the postsocialist transformation seems to reproduce the arguments of the mainstream 
theory. The four theses are summarized in Table 2.6 
 
                                                     
5 The classical formulation of this statement can be found in Moore (1974: 418): “no bourgeois no democracy.” 
6 Table 2 offers a typology that partially overlaps with that in Greskovits (2000). Greskovits constructs a two by 
two table along the dimensions of capitalism and democracy on the one hand and of the legacy of socialism on 
the other hand. He contrasts “The free market road to freedom thesis” with the “The impossibility theorem” 
(Greskovits 2000: 25). In Table 2 this contrast is discussed as the dichotomy of Compatibility thesis versus 
Incompatibility thesis. This is where the similarities between the two texts end. Greskovits combines the 
discussion of the relationship between capitalism and democracy with the analysis of the impact of the legacies 
of socialism on the postsocialist transformation. It allows for him to connect the issues of postsocialist 
democratic capitalism to the argument made by Hirschman in his “Tableau ideologique” (Hirschman 1992). 
Originally Hirschman’s table dealt with the rival theories of market society (capitalism). Hirschman asked two 
questions. First, do theories of market societies posit the self-sustainability or the self-destruction of market 
society? Second, do theories of market society posit a positive or a negative relationship between market society 
and the feudal past? Consequently, Hirschman did not discuss the relationship of capitalism and democracy. It is 
Greskovits’s interesting and important theoretical innov6ation to adapt Hirschman’s logic by connecting the 
issue of postsocialist democracy and capitalism to the issue of the socialist past. However, I do not follow him 
in this because I focus just on the relationship of capitalism and democracy. It explains why this paper is 
inspired not by Hirschman (1992) but by Offe (1984) as indicated in note 3. 
 5 
Table 2. Theories of postsocialist democratization and marketization 
Causal link supportive (+) antagonistic (-) 
Capitalism→Democracy 
Compatibility thesis 
Postsocialist economic reforms 
(privatization and marketization) 
are the necessary conditions of 
political democracy 
Partial economic reforms 
create rent-seeking winners 
interested in the weakening of 
democratic accountability 
Incompatibility thesis 
Postsocialist economic reforms are 
incompatible with democracy 
Capitalist transformation 
creates losers against whom 
economic reforms can be 
protected only weakening or 
giving up democracy 
Democracy→Capitalism 
Optimality thesis 
Democracy is the institutional 
safeguard of capitalist economic 
reforms 
Democracy puts a limitation 
on rent-seeking winners 
interested in partial reform-
equilibrium 
Breakdown thesis 
Democracy is the instrument of 
halting capitalist economic 
reforms 
Losers use democracy to slow 
down or halt capitalist 
economic reforms  
Source: author 
 
In general, the compatibility thesis builds on the argument that democracy cannot come into 
existence without capitalism, therefore the capitalist economic transformation is a necessary 
condition of a successful process of democratization. Particularly, this thesis points out that in 
the absence of comprehensive economic reforms the economic winners of partial economic 
transformation may be strong enough to weaken democracy in order to secure economic rents 
for themselves. If democratic accountability was weak, politicians would have less incentive 
to oppose state capture, to oppose to serve the interests of rent-seeking winners (Hellman 
1998: 232). In accordance with this argument the optimality thesis says that successful 
democratization is a necessary condition of postsocialist marketization just because it may 
contain the efforts of rent-seeking winners to maintain partial reform equilibrium (Hellman 
1998: 234; Vachudova 2005: 11-24). The two theses together emphasize that postsocialist 
democratization and marketization reinforce each other. The incompatibility thesis argues that 
market-oriented economic reforms cannot co-exist with political democracy, because the 
capitalist economic transformation creates a great number of economic losers who would cast 
a protest vote against painful economic reforms. Marketization should be protected against 
losers. In other words, capitalist transformation may be saved to the detriment of 
democratization (Przeworski 1991: 161, 182-187). The breakdown thesis also builds on the 
tension between democratization and marketization. It contends that the success of 
democratization undermines the success of marketization, just because it allows for the losers 
to halt the economic transformation (Offe 1991; Przeworski 1991).  
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 The controversy about postsocialist democratization and marketization shows 
similarity to the mainstream debate to the extent that those who argue about the tension 
between these processes emphasize the role of the losers in the transformation. Also, all these 
theories are built on a common methodological assumption according to which the coalitions 
and actions of socio-economic actors based on their economic interests explain political 
outcomes. 
 At the same time, the arguments that emphasize the correspondence and the mutual 
reinforcement of democratization and marketization in the postsocialist transformation point 
out that the key element of the dual transformation is the containment and weakening of 
economic winners. The emergence and stability of democratic capitalism is not based on the 
role of economic winners of capitalism, to the contrary, these transformations can be 
successful just because they weaken the economic winners. 
 This difference in theories is rooted in the different ways how capitalism emerged in 
the West and in the East. In the West industrial capitalism was more or less the result of a 
spontaneous economic process. The proliferation of capitalist activities created socio-
economic actors, we can call them winners, who had a strong interest in the autonomy of the 
economy, in the protection of private property rights and economic competition. In other 
words, the winners had an interest in limiting an almighty state that would intervene and 
question the autonomy of the emerging new private economic actors. Democracy was used as 
a means to introduce limitations on the autonomy of the state. The executive was made to be 
responsible to the Parliament, members of Parliament were elected by those who had a right 
to vote. Representative democracy curtailed the powers of the state. Within the system of 
democratic capitalism winners could represent their interests first by denying voting rights to 
the losers of industrialization, later by relying their superior economic resources within the 
system of mass democracy. Consequently, winners could pursue and represent their particular 
interests within the system of liberal (constitutional) democracy.7 
 In the East the postsocialist transformation introduced capitalism as a part of a 
political project. Political capitalism8 created private owners, capitalists as a result of  
economic reforms launched by political actors. As Hellman pointed out, this process may 
lead to a partial reform equilibrium that provides rents for economic winners who have an 
interest in preserving this equilibrium, since comprehensive economic reforms would 
                                                     
7 Liberal democracy is constitutional democracy and vice versa, therefore I use these terms as synonyms. On the 
issue of liberalism, constitutionalism and democracy see Zakaria (1997). 
8 This term is used by Staniszkis (1991) and Offe (1991: 877). 
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eliminate those market distortions that are the sources of rents. Consequently, the winners do 
not have an interest in establishing market competition and also they do not have an interest 
in establishing political competition. Strong political competition would reduce the chances 
of state capture, since having a strong democracy politicians need to be more responsive to 
voters and less responsive to rent-seeking private interest groups (Hellman 1998: 232; 
Vachudova 2005: 13-15). From it follows that a strong democracy and a strong capitalist 
market economy reinforce each other, and a defective democracy and an imperfect market 
economy also reinforce each other. In this system the winners pursue their private interests 
not within the system of constitutional democracy but by weakening the system of 
constitutional democracy.9 
 As opposed to the mainstream discourse about the relationship between capitalism 
and democracy the controversy about the postsocialist transformation contained real either/or 
choices. One cannot argue that democratization and marketization may simultaneously 
support and exclude each other. The theoretical debate led to the conclusion that 
democratization and marketization did reinforce each other. There were successful and 
unsuccessful postsocialist transformations. In the successful cases democratic capitalism 
emerged as an outcome just because comprehensive and radical economic and political 
reforms reinforced each other, in the unsuccessful cases democratic capitalism was  not 
reached just because limited democratic reforms and limited, partial economic reforms also 
reinforced each other. Consequently, this debate about the feasibility of simultaneous 
democratization and marketization remained within the dichotomy of success versus failure. 
This characteristic of the debate may also be seen as an important limitation from the 
perspective of a theory of regression of democratic capitalism. 
 The emergence of democratic capitalism in certain postsocialist countries was 
understood as a major success opposed to that of defective democracy and distorted market 
economy or capitalist dictatorship in some other countries. This dichotomy takes it as granted 
that democratic capitalism is a stable outcome based on the correspondence of its economic 
and political subsystems that create a coherent whole. The possible conflict of capitalism and 
democracy assumes the external contradiction of democratic capitalism to the mix of 
distorted capitalism and defective democracy and to capitalist dictatorship. The tacit 
assumption behind this dichotomy is the belief that postsocialist democratic capitalism is 
going to be similar to Western democratic capitalism. However, in order to understand why 
                                                     
9 Winners still may not have an interest in completely abandoning democracy and replacing it with dictatorship. 
See Székely-Doby (2016: 515-516). 
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the regression of democratic capitalism may take place in certain postsocialist countries, one 
has to ask the question whether it is the case or not. Will postsocialist democratic capitalism 
be different from, and less stable than, the Western versions of democratic capitalism? Will 
postsocialist democratic capitalism be sustainable in the first place? From the perspective of 
the theory of the regression of postsocialist democratic capitalism the challenge is how to 
explain regression in the light of the strong argument about the structural fit between 
capitalism and democracy. Is it possible to go beyond this argument without abandoning it? 
 I will look at two different theories that offer an alternative to the discourses we 
looked at above. The first one is Greskovits’s proposition. He introduces a theoretical 
distinction between democratic capitalism in the West and in the East. From this distinction it 
follows that democratic capitalism may be stable in the West but it is much less likely the 
case in the East. The second one is Merkel’s proposition to redefine the concept of 
democracy. On this basis he is able to distinguish between embedded and defective 
democracies. The first type we find in the West the second type in the East. Consequently, 
that distinction can explain why democratic capitalism is sustainable in the West and why 
regression may take place in the East. 
 
4. Theories of distortions of postsocialist democratic capitalism 
An important contribution to the understanding of these issues was made by Béla Greskovits 
who argued that postsocialist democratic capitalism was different from its Western variant, 
because it maintained an “enduring low-level equilibrium between incomplete democracy 
and imperfect market economy” (Greskovits 1998: 178). “Even the more successful East 
European nations will continue to exhibit varied combinations of relatively low-performing, 
institutionally mixed market economies and incomplete, elitist, and exclusionary democracies 
with a weak citizenship component” (Greskovits 1998: 184). In other words, we have to go 
beyond the dichotomy of success and failure in order to be able to establish the differences 
between Eastern and Western democratic capitalism. The latter may be sustainable but the 
former may not, just because postsocialist democratic capitalism differs from democratic 
capitalism in the West.  
 However, these characteristics of democratic deficit may exist and stay within the 
system of constitutional democracy how it emerged in the West. Constitutional democracies 
in the West are also elitist systems with politically passive citizens and with the exclusion of 
the poor and the weak. If we wanted to understand the postsocialist regression of democratic 
capitalism we need to ask the question why democratic deficits contribute to the dismantling 
 9 
of constitutional democracy in certain cases and why they do not lead to this outcome in 
some other cases. 
 In his recent paper Greskovits also asks this question. He introduces a theoretical 
distinction between hollowing and backsliding. Hollowing refers to the deficits of 
constitutional democracy, to the issues of democratic participation that remain within the 
system of constitutional democracy. Backsliding on the other hand means distortions in, and 
the regression of, constitutional democracy. For Greskovits the important question is how and 
under what conditions may hollowing lead to backsliding. 
 
On the one hand hollowing ought to have an impact on the risk of backsliding. How could 
democracy remain solid, if parties' membership and embeddedness in civil society evaporate at 
the same time as citizens lose appetite for their identification with parties, for voting at elec-
tions and joining civil society organizations? Who remains there to defend the system against 
its enemies once its popular content atrophies? On the other hand one could also argue that 
while western democracy has been eroding for several decades, instances of its serious 
backsliding let alone collapse have been rare after the Second World War. Ironically, then, the 
fact that the nascent postsocialist democracies exhibit symptoms of hollowing to a greater 
extent than their western counterparts but so far their majority has survived the recurrent hard 
times without reverting to authoritarianism, may send the message: there is a long way to go 
before hollowing leads to nondemocratic outcomes. (Greskovits 2015: 30) 
 
However, it means that there is no direct causal relationship between hollowing and 
backsliding. If hollowing is not a sufficient cause of backsliding, then what are those other 
factors that may cause the regression of democracy?  
 For the answer first we need a theory that explains the difference between 
constitutional and non-constitutional democracy. Having a clear concept of the dichotomy 
between constitutional and defective democracies, we can pose the question how regression 
may take place, how constitutional democracy may be transformed into defective democracy. 
A conceptual framework for comparing constitutional democracies and defective 
democracies is offered by Wolfgang Merkel (2004). In other words, he sets up a dichotomy 
between constitutional democracy and democracies that are distorted because they are not 
constitutional ones. For this reason Merkel offers a theory that goes beyond the Greskovits 
argument that kept the discussion of democratic distortions within the concept of 
constitutional democracy. 
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 Merkel explains that constitutional democracy is embedded democracy (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. The concept of embedded democracy 
 
Source: Merkel (2004: 37) 
 
The electoral regime is the core element of political democracy, but democracy works only if 
the electoral regime is embedded in four other subsystems. Political competition relies on the 
existence of civil rights, political liberties, the presence of the rule of law and separation of 
powers (horizontal accountability) and also the existence of elected officials who have power 
to rule. Any distortions in any of these subsystems create a specific variant of defective 
democracy. 
 The merit of this theory is that on the basis of a structural argument it is capable of 
identifying the different versions of deficient democracies. The theory measures and 
identifies the distortions of an existing political democracy by relating it to the concept of 
embedded democracy. 
 What are the causes of the emergence of deficient democracies? Merkel refers to 
long-term socio-economic and short term political processes that may distort the democratic 
system. Long term causes are related to the process of modernization, economic trends, the 
development of civil society and the political state. Short term causes are related to the type 
of the authoritarian predecessor regime, the characteristics of the democratization process, the 
role of informal institutions and the international contexts (Merkel 2004: 52-54). Merkel’s 
argument is summarized in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. The causes of deficient democracy in Merkel’s theory 
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Source: author, based on Merkel (2004). 
 
5. Causal explanation: party competition matters 
This structural argument leaves open the causal question of agency.10 Who are the actors? 
Who cause the distortions of democracy? By focusing on the role of actors we propose to 
insert a third variable that should mediate between the long-term and short-term causes 
above. The question about the actors in a democratic system is most essentially the question 
about political parties. If we want to explain the regression of political democracy we have to 
insert the role of political parties, the characteristics of party competition into the causal 
explanation. The pattern of party competition should explain the distortions of the embedding 
subsystems and the distortions of the electoral regime. The distortions of party competition 
cause the distortions of the democratic system. This argument is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. The causal explanation of defective democracy: the role of party politics 
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10 Enyedi points out that structural arguments focusing on long term historical processes are unable to explain 
the regression of democracy that may take place relatively fast. “The radical pace of the changes casts doubts on 
structuralist explanations. Neither modernization nor political culture theories can account for the extreme 
temporal variation in the quality of democracy” (Enyedi 2016: 216). 
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The functioning of party competition in an embedded democracy is going to cause changes in 
the embedding subsystems and in the electoral regime. If party competition ceases to be a 
robust one, if asymmetries in party competition come into existence, the winners of 
democratic elections may initiate sweeping changes in the political system that will lead to 
the distortion of the embedding subsystems and the electoral regime. The asymmetry of party 
competition means that the opponent parties of the winning party become weak. They lose 
the power to mobilize that amount of voters that would be necessary to win the next 
elections. Why may a robust party competition be transformed into an asymmetric one with 
weak parties in the opposition? This question is a complex one and goes beyond the scope of 
this paper, however let me just mention one issue that is related to the theories focusing on 
the role of losers in democratic capitalism. These theories offer an important aspect for 
understanding this change. If parties compete for losers in order to maximize votes and make 
economic promises they cannot keep when they get into office, they will lose credibility and 
as a consequence voter support. They will become small an weak. 
 The situation in Hungary after 2010 can serve as an example for the asymmetry of 
party competition. Due to the landslide victory of FIDESZ in 2010, the opposition parties 
became too weak to be able to challenge their opponent. What emerged was referred to by the 
leader of FIDESZ, Viktor Orban as “the central political power field”. What it means is 
shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. The “central political power field” 
 
 
MSZP, DK, PM, LMP                                    FIDESZ Jobbik 
   
   
Left                                                                  Centre Right 
 
Source: author 
 
The ruling party faces opponents both from the left and from the right. It helps the incumbent 
party to stay in power, since the votes for the opposition, the votes for left parties and those 
for the radical right party cannot be added. The incumbent party may stay in office if it 
collects more votes than the parties do to its left and to its right on their own. 
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 If the incumbent party or parties understand that they will not lose the next elections 
they will feel free to change the political and also the economic system according to their 
interests.11 They will initiate changes that cement them into power. As a consequence, a 
vicious circle may develop: the distortions of the embedding subsystems and the electoral 
regime caused by the asymmetry of party competition will reinforce each other and shelter 
the ruling party from further political competition. This argument is in line with the work of 
those scholars who deal with party politics in the postsocialist systems. This research 
emphasizes the importance of robust, symmetric party competition for the functioning of 
postsocialist political democracy and compares the different postsocialist political systems 
from this perspective (Grzymala-Busse 2006; Vachudova 2008). From it follows directly that 
distortions in party competition, the emergence of an asymmetric system of party competition 
may lead to the regression of democracy. 
 The proposition made in this paper is to bring the variable of the pattern of party 
competition into the causal explanation of the regression of postsocialist democratic 
capitalism. This explanation may be seen as shallow compared to structural theories that offer  
explanations that are deep.12 However, what we need to do is to connect shallow and deep 
explanations. It can be done by asking questions about the causes that lead to an asymmetric 
party competition. This is the issue that is addressed by Enyedi : 
 
The road to democratic backsliding started with elitist polarization, followed by a phase of 
populist polarization, and culminated in an illiberal democratic regime based on a dominant 
party system. While polarization has been present across all the phases, populism amplified its 
consequences. (Enyedi 2016: 218) 
 
Enyedi clearly connects backsliding to party competition in this statement. He links the 
emergence of illiberal democracy to the formation of an asymmetric party competition 
(dominant party system). He then goes further and argues that this new dominant party 
system is the consequence of previous party and elite polarization with a populist tint. This 
causal explanation avoids the traps of a simple tautology.13 Obviously, one may go further 
and ask the question what the causes of polarization are. Are there also other causes that 
contributed to backsliding? These are legitimate questions but they lie beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
                                                     
11 See also Székely-Doby (2016: 514).  
12 On the problem of shallow versus deep explanations see Kitschelt (2003) and Frye (2010: 18-19). 
13 Kitschelt argues correctly that too shallow explanations are basically tautologies (Kitschelt 2003: 64). 
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6. Distorted capitalism: the inverted order 
If we understand how embedded political democracy can be transformed into a deficient 
democracy, we can also understand how the capitalist economic system may become 
distorted. The distortions of postsocialist capitalism are caused by the distortions in 
democracy and not the other way round. This argument is in line with the theories of new 
political economy. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson argue that there exists an intrinsic connection 
between political and economic institutions and this connection is of hierarchical nature: the 
causal direction starts from the polity and goes toward the economy. “[…] political 
institutions determine the distribution of de jure political power, which in turn affects the 
choice of economic institutions. This framework therefore introduces a natural concept of a 
hierarchy of institutions, with political institutions influencing equilibrium economic 
institutions, which then determine economic outcomes [...]” (Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 
2004: 5.). 
 North and his co-authors also draw attention to the importance of the internal 
relationships between the economic and the political system. “The seeming independence of 
the economic and political systems on the surface is apparent, not real. In fact, these systems 
are deeply intertwined” (North et al. 2009: 269). 
 János Kornai showed that the socialist system was determined by the political system 
(Kornai 1992). Comparing socialism and capitalism he generalized this statement by arguing 
that the capitalist system is also causally determined by the political system. 
 
Figure 6. Models of the socialist and capitalist systems 
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Source: Kornai (2000: 29). 
 
On the basis of this comparison we can understand that the capitalist economy may be 
institutionalized and maintained by either political dictatorship or political democracy 
(Kornai 2000: 29). This argument is framed within the dichotomy of democratic capitalism 
versus capitalist dictatorship, but may also underpin a reasoning that aims at the explanation 
of the mix of defective democracy and imperfect capitalism (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. The causal line of distortions 
 
Source: author 
 
The causal link starts in the political sphere. An incumbent party that is not constrained by 
political competition will have a free hand to reshape the political and the economic system 
in order to cement its political power by changing political rules and the allocation of 
economic resources behind the veil of legality. The result will be a system of distorted 
political democracy and capitalism. In this system the political and the economic subsystems 
reinforce each other and maintain the distortions.14 The argument is summarized in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. The vicious circle of distortions in democratic capitalism 
                                                     
14 North et al. also emphasize the importance of the correspondence between the intrinsic structures of the 
political and the economic system. They call it the theory of double balance (North et al. 2009: 20) Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2012: 76-77) also underline that there is an intrinsic relationship between the institutional 
configurations of the polity and the economy: extractive political institutions build up a coherent whole with 
extractive economic institutions, while inclusive political institutions generate and maintain inclusive economic 
institutions. 
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Asymmetric party competition 
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Source: author 
 
Defective democracy will serve the incumbent party to create an economic clientele that 
provides economic resources for the political elite in power. These economic resources 
should assist the incumbent party to win future elections. The limitation of market 
coordination thus serves political interests and leads to crony capitalism. The result is the 
partial intertwinement of the private and public sphere and the weakening of the rule of law.15 
 In his recent essay János Kornai has built a structural theory for the conceptualization 
of the regression of postsocialist democratic capitalism (Kornai 2016). The causal argument 
offered in Figure 7 and 8 builds on Kornai (2000) and indicates how structure and action may 
be combined within the framework of a causal argument. This proposition is also compatible 
with Kornai (2016) to the extent that this text distinguishes between primary and secondary 
features of the socialist and capitalist systems (Kornai 2016: 552-555). The causal links in 
Figure 6 and 7 represent the primary characteristics of these systems (Blocks 1, 2 and 3 in 
Figure 6 and 7). However, this paper follows Merkel (2004) in identifying the regression of 
postsocialist political democracy as a specific form of defective democracy. Kornai has 
developed a different typology for the analysis of the regression of democratic capitalism 
(Kornai 2016: 563-567). He has set up a typology based on the conceptual differences of 
democracy, autocracy and dictatorship and introduced the category of autocratic capitalism 
in order to make it clear that the regression of postsocialist democratic capitalism led to a 
system that is not democratic capitalism anymore (Kornai 2016: 574-576; 588-590). 
 
7. Can non-robust party competition be really the cause of the regression of capitalism? 
In this paper symmetric, robust party competition is seen as the political safeguard of 
capitalism and asymmetric, non-robust party competition is understood as a cause of 
distortions of both democracy and capitalism. Let me call it the Robustness thesis. This thesis 
                                                     
15 See also Székely-Doby (2016). 
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seems to partially contradict Frye’s theory. Although Frye (2002; 2010) also connects the 
distortions of postsocialist capitalism to the distortions of postsocialist party competition, he 
argues that the distortions in capitalism are due to political polarization. Consequently, 
capitalism will work only if polarization gives way to an asymmetric party system, in which 
one faction wins over the other. Robust party competition may support consistent economic 
reforms only if the party system is not polarized. These are the necessary conditions for the 
introduction of consistent reforms and economic policies (Frye 2002: 332). Let me call 
Frye’s argument the Polarization thesis. 
 For the purpose to assess the meaning of the Polarization thesis and the Robustness 
thesis and to clarify their relationship, I propose to make an analytical distinction between 
polarized and robust party competition. Frye says that “Political polarization is viewed as the 
policy distance on economic issues between the executive and the largest opposition faction 
in parliament.” (Frye 2010: 3) For postsocialist democracies political polarization means the 
presence of strong ex-communist and strong anti-communist parties within the political 
system (Frye 2002: 312). Robustness can be defined as symmetric party competition with 
similarly strong competing parties. In other words, party competition is robust, if the 
probability of the re-election of the incumbent party or parties is not high. The combination 
of these two dimensions defines four cases (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3. Polarization versus robustness of democratic party competition 
 
Robustness 
High 
(symmetric party competition) 
Low 
(asymmetric party 
competition) 
Polarization 
High 
Polarization thesis: 
Failure of consistent capitalist 
reforms 
Polarization thesis: 
Success of consistent 
capitalist reforms 
Robustness thesis: 
Limited success of consistent 
capitalist reforms 
Low 
Robustness thesis: 
Success of consistent capitalist 
reforms  
Polarization thesis: 
Success of consistent 
capitalist reforms 
Robustness thesis: 
Regression of capitalism 
Source: author 
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If robust party competition is also a polarized one, we can expect the failure of consistent 
capitalist reforms. This is what the Polarization thesis argues for: “democracy is positively 
related to more rapid and consistent reform when political polarization is low, but each 
increase in polarization dampens the beneficial impact of democracy on the pace and 
consistency of reform.” (Frye 2010: 3). Why may political polarization slow down economic 
reforms? Because if the opposition wins the next election, it will reverse these reforms, since 
it represents a polarly different ideology: in a highly polarized democracy ex-communist 
parties face anti-communist parties.16 However, this argument is not based exclusively on the 
concept of policy distance among the competing parties but also assumes the robustness of 
political competition. The Polarization thesis is relies on a combination of high robustness 
and high polarization. 
 The Robustness thesis argues that symmetric party competition leads to self-
correcting and consistent economic reforms just because the parties of the opposition seem to 
be strong enough to punish the incumbent parties if they introduce inconsistent reforms or 
initiate the regression of capitalism. However, this argument is not based exclusively on the 
concept of robustness of party competition but also assumes low polarization of political 
parties. Robust party competition will lead to and make sustainable capitalism if both the 
incumbent parties and the opposition parties are anticommunist that is if they follow similarly 
procapitalist ideologies. The Robustness thesis is based on a combination of high robustness 
and low polarization. If polarization is low and party competition is robust, the Robustness 
thesis that posits a positive relationship between symmetric party competition and consistent 
economic reforms will be just right. In other words, while the Polarization thesis more or less 
tacitly assumes that robustness is high in the first case, the Robustness thesis also tacitly 
assumes that polarization is low in the second case. That is why they do not contradict but 
supplement each other. Frye also makes it clear that robustness may support economic 
reforms if the polarization of party competition is low. “In contrast, executive turnover when 
political polarization is low is unlikely to produce swings in policy, given minimal 
differences in economic policy between rival factions” (Frye 2010: 11). 
 The Polarization thesis finds that high polarization connected with non-robust party 
competition is favorable for consistent economic reforms, since non-robustness leads to a 
dominant party system in which either the ex-communist or the anti-communist parties 
exercise power that is not challenged effectively by their opponents. In this case the large 
                                                     
16 “Political polarization in a democracy increases the likelihood of a reversal in policy should the opposition 
come to power unexpectedly and thereby weakens the incentives of citizens to invest” (Frye 2010: 4). 
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policy distance between the competing parties will not create uncertainty and cannot threaten 
with the reversal of policies. It is important to remark that the Polarization thesis treats this 
case as a variant of non-polarized party system. The intuition behind this may be that due to 
the asymmetry of party competition the polarization of ideologies is unimportant: the 
dominant party can consistently do what it wants to do be it ex-communist or anti-
communist. Still, from the perspective of analytical clarity it is important to emphasize that 
this case is a combination of high polarization and low robustness. 
 The Robustness thesis finds that the combination of high polarization and low 
robustness will support economic reforms if the dominant parties are procapitalist parties and 
not ex-communist (or communist) parties. However, the Robustness thesis will also say that 
in the absence of strong procapitalist parties in the opposition economic reforms may also be 
inconsistent. A dominant party system will reduce the available policy options and hinder 
political democracy to correct policy errors.17 To sum up, there is an overlap between the two 
theses in this case, although the Robustness thesis identifies inconsistency issues with 
economic reforms that the Polarization thesis does not see. 
 Finally, the Polarization thesis interprets the case of the combination of low 
polarization and low robustness as a favorable condition for consistent economic reforms. As 
we saw, the main argument is that low robustness in itself supports consistent economic 
reforms. Low polarization in the sense of having competing political parties that offer similar 
economic policies simply reinforces those positive features of the dominant party system that 
help to eliminate the uncertainties that could have led to inconsistent economic reforms. 
 The Robustness thesis offers an antithetical argument which says that within a 
dominant party system the incumbent procapitalist parties still may introduce inconsistent 
reforms and initiate a regression of capitalism just because these parties do not face a strong 
opposition that would make the threat to lose power credible. The Polarization thesis is able 
to explain why high polarization leads to inconsistent economic reforms and why low 
robustness may lead to consistent economic reforms, but does not explain why low 
robustness coupled with low polarization may led to the regression of capitalism. At the same 
time the Robustness thesis can offer an explanation for this regression.18 
                                                     
17 This argument was used by Grzymala-Busse for the analysis of Czech postsocialist transformation between 
1990 and 1998 (Grzymala-Busse 2006: 431). 
18 The explanations of the regression of postsocialist democracy and capitalism may argue that the polarization 
of the party system is an important factor in the causal chain leading to a defective democracy. Does it mean 
that low polarization has nothing to do with the regression? No, it does not. It is important to keep it in mind 
that the concept of polarization in this paper refers to polarization along the economic cleavage. At the same 
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 The Robustness thesis does not take it for granted that anti-communist parties will not 
initiate a regression of democratic capitalism. This is the interesting question from the 
perspective of the regression of postsocialist democratic capitalism: how anti-communist 
parties become a threat to democracy and capitalism? The Polarization thesis assumes that 
anti-communist parties favor democratic capitalism. However, the question we have to pose 
is do they? If they do, under what conditions? If they do not, why not? 
 
7. Conclusion 
The main proposition of this paper is that we have to focus on the role of the pattern of party 
competition for a causal explanation of the regression of postsocialist democratic capitalism. 
The review of literature offered by this text serves to validate this proposition. In order to get 
to a causal argument of regression I brought together and examined different branches of the 
theory on democracy and capitalism, on party politics, on political economy. 
 The discussion of mainstream and postsocialist controversies about the relationship 
between capitalism and democracy led to the conclusion that they explain the sustainability 
of democratic capitalism and not its regression. However, these debates articulate the roles 
winners and losers may play in strengthening and weakening of democratic capitalism. This 
idea is important for understanding regression. The pattern of party competition is shaped by 
political parties competing for the votes of losers. This competition may result in an 
asymmetry of the strength of incumbent parties against parties in opposition and open up the 
road to a regression of democracy. 
 The concept of low-level equilibrium between incomplete democracy and imperfect 
market economy challenges the previous discourses by proposing a theory on the basis of 
which Western democratic capitalism can be distinguished from Eastern postsocialist 
democratic capitalism. It is an important step toward the theory of the regression of 
postsocialist democratic capitalism, since it helps us to understand why democratic capitalism 
may be more stable in the West than in the East. At the same time this argument keeps the 
analysis of postsocialist democratic capitalism within the paradigm it challenges by focusing 
on those structural issues within the low-level equilibrium that also exist within high-level 
equilibrium, albeit in a weaker form. On the other hand, we are still left with the problem 
why regression takes place in some postsocialist countries and not in others, although they all 
may show the same structural features of the low-level equilibrium. Or can it be explained by 
                                                                                                                                                                     
time the argument about polarization of the party system contributing to the regression of democracy is about 
polarization along the cultural cleavage. 
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the different level of hollowing? Greskovits rightly shows that we cannot establish a direct 
causal relationship between hollowing and backsliding (regression). 
 The explanation of democratic regression is an explanation of how we get from 
constitutional democracy to a distorted one. For this we need a theory that makes distinctions 
between constitutional and non-constitutional democracies. These distinctions are offered by 
the theory of embedded democracy. This theory helps us to look for the causes of democratic 
regression in a domain that is beyond constitutional democracy. The problem with Merkel’s 
argument is that it is mainly structural. We need to insert the issue of agency into a causal 
explanation of democratic regression. It takes us to the proposition that we need to look at the 
role of political parties and the pattern of party competition. Party politics matter. The 
postsocialist literature on party politics teaches us that constitutional democracy is maintained 
if party competition is robust (symmetric). From this it follows that if party competition 
ceases to be robust and symmetric democratic regression may occur. The next question is 
whether democratic regression is connected to the regression of capitalism. I answered this 
question in the affirmative. I could rely on the literature of new political economy in this 
answer. New political economy argues that the transformation of the economic system is 
causally related to the transformation of the political system. Consequently, distortions in 
democracy lead to distortions in capitalism. It generates a vicious circle, the mutual 
reinforcement of the regression of democracy and the regression of capitalism. 
 To sum up, the regression of postsocialist democratic capitalism starts in the political 
sphere. The distortions in party competition, the emergence of an asymmetric political 
competition lead to the distortions of capitalism. This process should be understood not from 
economic but political interests. The ruling political elite may introduce distortions in the 
political and the economic subsystems in order to preserve its rule. State capture, the 
endeavor of economic interest groups to influence political decisions in order to appropriate 
economic rents does exist in postsocialist states, however the regression of democratic 
capitalism is mainly due to an inverted order of interests representation: it is the political 
actors who intervene into the allocation of resources and create their own economic clientele 
in order to serve their political interests, in order to be able to stay in power. 
 It is legitimate to ask the question: what are the causes of the asymmetry of party 
competition? To answer this question one has to turn to history, to structural arguments and 
the analysis of empirical cases. This paper stopped earlier than that, it tried to review theories 
and contribute to setting up a theoretical framework that may be useful for further theoretical 
and empirical analyses. 
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